Introduction
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in late 1991, the newly established Russian Federation was arguably preoccupied with its own economic and political consolidation as well as its regional and global identity, all being of crucial relevance for foreign policy choices. 1 Cognizant of the three possible arrangements for Europe in the 1990s-one Europe, offering a pan-European economic, political, and security system; a European Union-Russian balance, with the understanding that the former Warsaw Pact states would seek membership in the EU at some point; and the new project for US hegemony, largely corresponding to NATO's expansion and, in fact, the inclusion of the former Warsaw Pact states among its members) 2 -Russia understood the need for a substantial external engagement. The fact that the North Atlantic Alliance was clearly interested in the former Warsaw Pact states contributed to an increase of antagonism between Moscow and NATO; in the Kremlin, the idea that the former Soviet satellite states of Central and Eastern Europe decided to change their position and go so far as to side militarily with the West "understandably exasperated Russians of all political colors." 3 As it turned out, in addition to following the developments in the so-called "near abroad" (because of substantial Russian minority populations in some of the post-Soviet states), 4 the Moscow administration decided to pay close attention to the situation in the Balkans.
In the Yugoslav case, aware of its past relationship with the Serbian people, and in contrast to European Community officials (apart from the Greeks), Russian representatives attended the ceremony proclaiming the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), a new state established by Serbia and Montenegro, in 1992.
5 Such a decision reflected what Iulii Vorontsov, Russian representative to the UN, would describe as Russia's overall ambition-"to strengthen the traditional links of friendship and cooperation with the Yugoslav peoples, to restore peace to their land and to guarantee their freedom and independence." 6 With the outbreak of conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Russian authorities repeatedly condemned the fighting, warning the parties of its pos- United Nations Security Council, "Security Council Provisional Verbatim Record," 30 May 1992, S/PV.3082. Still, as concluded in the literature assessing the first half of the 1990s, "securing Russia's influence in the Balkans had been subordinated to the larger aim of establishing cooperative relations with the Western democracies" (Derek Averre, "From Pristina to Tskhinvali: The Legacy of Operation Allied Force sible escalation, and advocating punishment of those responsible. 7 In addition, within the Contact Group, established in 1994 to deal with the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Russian representatives strongly opposed the intentions of their Western colleagues (from France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States). They were "opposed to any use of force against the Serbs, fearing repercussions at home among nationalist politicians," who kept criticizing President Boris Yeltsin for "kowtowing to the West rather than coming to the aid of Serbs, with whom Russians share the Orthodox religion and a Slavic heritage." 8 As assessed in the literature, supporting the Serbian side during the Yugoslav crisis and often rejecting Western foreign policy initiatives was not an easy task, especially when it turned out that many provocations and violent acts were actually committed by the regime of Slobodan Milošević.
9 One author argues that Russia's confrontational position in the Balkans made certain other policy choices, in fact, more probable. Russia's decision not to hold the Serbs accountable for their wrongdoing did indeed help to solidify NATO's decision to pursue military intervention. This does not mean that a different approach might have prevented intervention, though it might have made the Serbs aware of their unfavorable position and forced them to give up sooner. 10 The Kosovo question secured more international attention after the signing of the 1995 Dayton Agreement, which brought the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina to an end and, very importantly for subsequent discussions about the Kosovo case, clearly insisted on the notion of territorial integrity. The dominant view in Russia was that Kosovo had to be approached as a Serbian internal issue and therefore Serbian sovereignty should not be challenged-an approach that went hand in hand with Russia's domestic secessionist concerns, mainly in Chechnya.
11 Still, the international decision to leave the Kosovo question unaddressed in the mid-1990s represented an opportunity for the militarist in Russia's Relations with the West," International Affairs 85, no. 3 [2009] : 575-91, here 577).
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They stressed that "Russia ha [d] pursued an unwavering course of putting an end to war crimes and cannot remain indifferent to the flagrant mass violations of international humanitarian law in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. Murder, rape and 'ethnic cleansing' must cease immediately, and the guilty-whatever their affiliation-must be duly punished" (United Nations Security Council, "Security Council Provisional Verbatim Record," 22 February 1993, S/PV.3175).
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) to criticize and ignore the pacifist doctrine of the Democratic League of Kosovo, established by a group of Albanian intellectuals in 1989 to protect Kosovo Albanian interests across the Yugoslav Federation. 12 As it turned out, the escalation of confrontations between local Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo was accompanied by a series of events in which the standpoint and expectations of the Russian side could not be ignored by its Western counterparts, even though in the end "Russia's diplomacy during the [1999] war was as fruitless as were its efforts to prevent NATO's assault." 13 However, after the war, as assessed in 2000 by Oleg Levitin, who was directly involved in Moscow's Balkan policies throughout the 1990s, Kosovo became "closely intertwined with issues that are vital to Moscow-issues of European security and relations with the West," implying that it would stay on the Russian foreign policy agenda in years to come.
14 While the majority of scholarly examinations of the Kosovo case have rightly focused on the overall context-the legality and possible consequences of the 1999 NATO involvement, the post-intervention local and international positions, Kosovo's proclamation of independence and its recognition, and, finally, Kosovo's capacity to pursue necessary reforms in order to become a viable state-the question of how some of the players approached the Kosovo crisis as a possible means of strengthening their own influence on a broader scale has remained largely ignored. Accordingly, this article looks at the official Russian rhetoric and the country's overall position during and after the 1999 Kosovo crisis. It shows that the Russian leadership generally favored the Serbian authorities and their often-disputed policies (as it did throughout the decade preceding the Kosovo crisis), but that more importantly for its own relevance, it felt the urge to oppose the NATO intervention and the post-interventionist Western discourse and policy choices. In so doing, it increased both the presence and the influence of Russia. Moreover, the obvious fatigue that faced the Brussels administration-to come up with a common EU position regarding the status of Kosovo despite the existence of secessionist debates within some of its member states, although none had objected to the previous NATO action-represented an additional incentive for the Russian leadership to insist on the rightness of its own uncompromised view and thus to reinforce its place in European affairs. The argument that Russia has been primarily concerned with strengthening its own position and that its involvement in the Kosovo question was expected to serve such an ambition can be even better understood by looking at some recent discrepancies characterizing the official Russian stance when the government has been confronted with the principle 12 For a detailed account of the KLA and its position vis-à-vis other groups and people, see David L. Phillips of territorial integrity, to wit: Russia has strongly insisted on the principle of territorial integrity in the case of Serbia (in order that Kosovo remain a constituent unit) but completely ignored such a principle in the case of Ukraine, in 2014, when it not only supported the disintegration of that country but also annexed Crimea, suggesting that Russia's loud advocacy of territorial integrity was largely an instrument to give it standing in European official debates, especially when discussions about Kosovo's final status got underway.
Russia and the 1999 NATO Involvement in the FRY
UN Security Council resolution 1160, adopted in March 1998, stipulated that "the principles for a solution of the Kosovo problem should be based on the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia." 15 In June, President Slobodan Milošević traveled to Moscow, where he sought additional support from Yeltsin. Some Priština-based media reported that the Serbian leader wanted Russian support "based on the principle of ignoring the Albanians" and "that Russia has given him such support, because Yeltsin and Milošević would not have signed a document which decides about the destiny of the third, that is, which gratifies the wishes of only one party. But such an approach to the problem of Kosovo is not realistic." 16 Later, the Russian Duma called for a peaceful solution to the Kosovo crisis. It stressed that "Russian politicians have been very vocal in their support for the Serbs in Kosovo territory" but also outlined their concerns that "the threat of airstrikes is not over yet," warning the West that if there should be airstrikes, "NATO will start its own Chechen war." 17 Bearing this in mind, it can be argued that up to this point official discussions within the international community had failed to agree on a single strategy. In the assessment of one observer, "[i]f one consequence of international diplomacy over the past decade has been to radicalize the Kosovar Albanians, another has been to embolden Milošević or, at the very least, not to discourage him." 18 The frequent disputes and confrontations between Serbian troops and the militarist KLA culminated in January 1999 when Serbian military forces massacred more than forty Albanians in the village of Račak, in central Kosovo. 19 25 Although the decision to exclude Russia was not without opponents among NATO officials, they nevertheless sided with the dominant US and British view, "sending out pathetic little signals of concern as the military juggernaut headed for the abyss"-a rigorous approach that was reconsidered only when NATO Secretary General Javier Solana himself stated that "'Russia must be on board' if the West was to tackle the critical issue of Kosovo," explaining that "Russia should be involved both because that would maximize the chances of a successful settlement and because to leave Russia out would be a colossal strategic snub." 26 However, with regard to Russia's position and options during the NA-TO-led air campaign against the FRY, Gabriel Gorodetsky is correct in saying that the Kosovo crisis best outlined "both the aspirations and the constraints of Russian foreign policy." While on the one hand it confirmed "the continued significance attached by Moscow to traditional interests, and particularly the predominance of the concept of spheres of influence," on the other it exposed "the limits of Russia's capability for executing a more dynamic, resolute and independent policy." 27 More precisely, the negative reaction to NATO bombing of Yugoslavia came from the country's political elites as well as from other sectors of Russian society, with some of their members labeling the aggression as "'barbaric,' 'genocidal' and 'Hitlerite.'" 28 Some representatives of the Russian Democratic Left, while strongly rejecting the so-called humanitarian as- 30 From a different perspective, former and current members of the military-impossible to ignore due to the size of this electorate-kept expressing their anti-Western feelings and, in fact, became, even more pro-nationalist, thus managing to secure additional influence in Russian foreign policy. Still, it is important to note that the above views were not without opposition. For example, Russian liberals and the general public, although aware of their country's national interests, did not fully discredit the West's intention to protect human rights violations in Kosovo. As summarized elsewhere, "[a]fter independent TV channels showed pictures of the suffering of Kosovo Albanian refugees, strong feelings began to subside," and this was exactly the point at which "[t]he section of the electorate committed to democracy, began to see that a pro-Serb and anti-American policy worked in favor of the communists."
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As a matter of official protest, the Russian leadership declined the invitation to attend the 50th anniversary NATO summit in Washington. Still, such a decision did not mean that Russia was going to do anything substantial, even though President Yeltsin had stipulated at the very beginning of the bombing that "[i]n the event that the military conflict worsens, Russia retains the right to take adequate measures, including military ones, to defend itself and the overall security of Europe."
32 Even some Serbian politicians were rather skeptical about Russia's overall capability; according to Vuk Drašković, Yugoslav Deputy Prime Minister, "[t]he people should be told that NATO is not facing a breakdown, that Russia will not help Yugoslavia militarily, and that world 33 In contrast to the NATO summit, the Russian delegation did take part in a series of meetings that followed. For example, its presence at the June G8 Foreign Ministers meeting, held in Cologne, was of crucial relevance. At this point, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanovwhile aware of the importance of an earlier peace plan, presented by Martti Ahtisaari, President of Finland and an EU envoy, and Victor Chernomyrdin, Special Representative of the President of Russia, to President Milošević in Belgrade on 2 June 1999, and accepted by the Yugoslav authorities-assessed the proposed document: "This sort of document hardly ever satisfies those who take part in the negotiations. The important point is that this document should allow us to achieve the objectives that we had, which is to stop the war in the Balkans." 34 As the war came to an end, Russia decided to send troops to the Priština international airport on 12 June, occupying it before the arrival of the previously authorized NATO troops-a decision due to the marginal Russian presence within the new setting. 35 Despite its peaceful outcome, this incident confirmed the Russian leadership's concerns about the future position of the Serbian population in Kosovo under foreign supervision, but more importantly dilemmas about its own reputation at home and within the international system. When it comes to public opinion, even though the majority of Russians objected to the deployment of troops to Kosovo, they nevertheless believed that such presence was more relevant for Russia itself than the FRY, as it would boost Russia's international reputation. 36 Thus, the Kosovo case managed to influence Russia's understanding of its own position and its relations with the rest of the world. The fact that NATO nevertheless decided to get involved militarily in the FRY-an approach strongly opposed by the Russians-was understood as a demonstration of "insulting disregard toward Russia" and intention to ostracize its participation in resolving some core European issues: "The air strikes against Yugoslavia, as viewed by Russia, were the most convincing justification for its negativity with respect to the prospect of establishing a Williams and Golenkova, "Russia," 218. NATO-centered Europe." 37 With this in mind, it was not difficult to foresee the continuation of standpoint differences between the West and Russia in the post-bombing period, now primarily focused on the future status of Kosovo.
Russian Post-1999 Consolidation of Relevance
Once the 1999 NATO-led intervention had terminated, the UN Security Council Resolution 1244 established the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), exercising full executive, legislative, and judicial roles. The resolution declared the "establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo as a part of the international civil presence under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, to be decided by the Security Council of the United Nations. The interim administration was to provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo." 38 The meetings accompanying Resolution 1244 were expected to clarify the position of external powers in the handling of the newly faced situation. For example, on 16 June, US Defense Secretary William Cohen talked to his Russian counterpart, Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev, in Helsinki; at this point, he insisted that Russia had to meet NATO's requirements: "[W]e made it very clear there cannot be a separate sector for Russia. So we are trying to find ways in which we can meet their needs, but not in any way violate the fundamental rules that NATO has to insist upon." 39 A few days later, in Brussels, NATO delivered a statement clarifying that it "look[ed] forward to the participation of the Russian Federation in KFOR [NATO-led Kosovo Force] within a unified chain of command" and that it "remain[ed] ready to resume consultations and full cooperation in the framework of the NATO-Russia Founding Act."
40 Finally, at the G8 summit in Cologne, in the period 18-20 June, the leaders jointly expressed appreciation for Resolution 1244 and the efforts invested by the concerned parties. As the joint statement put it, the international community perceived the safe and systematic return of refugees and displaced persons as well as the provision of protection and security for all the minority groups as its high priorities-priorities that expected steady commitment and the belief of the residents of Kosovo that working together would help create a truly democratic and multi-ethnic Kosovo. 41 However, the allocation of international supervisory duties that was put in place and expected to be able to deal with the above mentioned issues would later become a matter of serious concern and harsh criticism, mostly due to the precarious position of local Serbs. As James Hughes has correctly put it, "NATO's insistence on a marginal Russian military presence undoubtedly contributed to the ethnic cleansing of Serbs from Kosovo, as a stronger Russian contingent would have been more productive than NATO forces in defending Serb areas." 42 The position of the European Union indicates that it saw the region as impoverished. It persuaded the international community to collaborate in the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, adopted in Cologne. More precisely, the Brussels administration was concerned with the still-in-power Milošević regime, the provision of support to the anti-Milošević Democratic Opposition of Serbia (which eventually overthrew him, in early October 2000), and the fragile and highly unpredictable situation in the post-intervention Kosovo. The Russian position, although challenged by the country's marginal involvement in the post-conflict NATO-dominated context, continued to confirm the previously offered arguments about the overall wrongdoing of the West in the Kosovo case. Vladimir Putin, soon after being elected president of Russia, in March 2000, approved the document "Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation," which among other interests and priorities, stipulated that Russia was ready to give "an all-out assistance to the attainment of a just settlement of the situation in the Balkans, one based on the coordinated decisions of the world community."
43 Accordingly, the settlement outcome implied preservation of the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and, thus, strictly opposed any idea of partitioning of the state, as such a move would run the risk of the "emergence of a pan-Balkan conflict with unpredictable conse- quences."
44 Moreover, given the critical moment at which it was producedafter the bombing, but with Milošević still in office, this document warned that any idea about the straightforwardness of the process dealing with the status of Kosovo, which would result in independence but would at the same time require Russian input, was a pure misunderstanding. Here, apart from being interested in defending the very idea of territorial integrity, quite a few Russian representatives believed that Russia stood a fair chance to consolidate its global influence by (1) insisting on something that bore significant ethical considerations regardless of the region and (2) trying to discredit not only the European Union as such, but also its individual members for supporting the NATO intervention. In their view, the so-called aggressors (even if not convinced about the policies pursued) had to do everything in order to provide Kosovo with independent status, which would in return ensure us that their approach was right and the only one. 45 In Serbia, following the overthrow of Milošević, the country's new president, Vojislav Koštunica, although aware of the importance of integration in the European Union, still openly expressed appreciation for the Russian approach. His Democratic Party of Serbia's nationalist-conservative discourse insisted that the status of Kosovo should dominate the country's foreign policy. As argued, Western pressure to address the Kosovo question-meaning to grant it full independence at some point-had an alternative in Serbia's closer relations with Russia. During his visit to Moscow in late October 2000, Koštunica welcomed Russia's interest in the region, stating that "[t]he Russian presence must be felt in all the intersecting strategic geopolitical influences in the Balkans," so that a greater balance of European, Russian, and US forces could be achieved. 46 Aware of the problems and in order to find a durable solution, the international community welcomed the "standards before status" approach, inaugurated by the third UNMIK chief, Michael Steiner of Germany, in 2003.
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Although the "standards before status" policy covered a variety of issues, ranging from the establishment of democratic institutions and rule of law to the development of a market economy and dialogue with Belgrade authorities, its essence "was that it required Kosovo's institutions of self-government to demonstrate that they were willing and able to protect the rights of all of Kosovo's ethnic communities, and had the capacity to act in a civilized way." 51 While the international community seemed to be enthusiastic about the Kosovo Albanian capabilities to address the expressed concerns, the Russian and Serbian leaderships were rather guarded, seeing the pro-independence parties as too optimistic. In fact, Belgrade and Moscow believed that the policy being promoted (in combination with the sections related to Serbian territorial sovereignty under Resolution 1244) served their ambition to discredit the validity of the status talk or, at least, to put it on hold. In addition, given the complexity of the situation, in which both the Serbian and Kosovo Albanian representatives approached the Kosovo question by having only a plan A, according to which one party would end up as an absolute winner whereas the other would be an absolute loser, the "standards before status" policy provided a brief moment for policy reconsiderations amongst some Western officials. 52 However, the advocacy of "standards before status" was fully eroded and, in fact, abandoned after the riots in mid-March 2004, involving more than 50,000 ethnic Albanian extremists that gathered to attack Serbs and Roma. 53 In the newly established gray zone, the Standards Implementation Plan was introduced, placing a particular focus on the economy, rule of law, and dialogue between Belgrade and Priština. Thus, the international community, while positioned between the two opposing sides, understood that substantial progress with regard to human rights could not be made any time soon, but also that lack of status and Kosovo's security were affecting the entire Balkan region. As one 2004 analysis correctly put it, following the termination of the 1999 war, the international community continuously grappled with the Kosovo dilemma, suggesting that although Kosovo's status was absolutely crucial for a durable solution and the stability of the Balkans, tackling the status question in itself undoubtedly represented a risk to stability: "If the international community tackles the status issue without adequate preparation, deadlock at best and confrontation at worst might be the result. If it waited for too long the unstable elements on the ground, in particular the impatience of the Kosovar population, the persistent economic crisis and the still tense relations between the ethnic communities might well lead to a new crisis." 54 The late 2005 Vienna talks were launched with an aim to resolve the final status of Kosovo. Led by UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari and involving members of the Contact Group, the talks were expected to find the solution within Resolution 1244, which-although protecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the FRY-at this point, could have been interpreted in two ways: "Either it applied to the interim period of UN administration or it applied beyond that, constraining options for a final status agreement on Kosovo." 55 However, once the Serbian and Kosovo Albanian representatives started travelling to Vienna, it did not take long to realize that all of them attended the rounds with a plan A only, suggesting that one side would have to give up and accommodate the other. For example, the January 2006 session, very much concerned with the question of decentralization as capable of providing mechanisms to protect the minorities, was a complete failure; as observed afterwards, "neither side had given an inch," meaning that "relief agencies are preparing for the least-bad option-another exodus of Serbs." 56 In contrast to their Western counterparts, the Russians tried to make it clear that they would not support any outcome that would go against the Serbs. Even at one point during the process, while sensing the possibility of certain issues being ignored, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russian Federation felt it necessary to restate Moscow's approach: A priority objective is to provide for practical application of standards with a view to ensuring respect for fundamental rights and freedoms of all ethnic groups in the region. We insist that the settlement process should evolve in strict compliance with Security Council resolution 1244… We consider it necessary that negotiations on the future status of Kosovo be preceded by a decision of the UN Security Council based on the results of the Council's review of the progress in the application of the standards … It is a matter of principal importance to assume that the decision on Kosovo will be of a universal character. It will set a precedent. Any speculation about the uniqueness of the Kosovo case is just an attempt to circumvent international legal rules, which distracts from reality. What is worse is that attempts of that kind generate distrust of the international community as it creates an impression of double standards being applied to the settlement of crises in various regions worldwide and of rules being enforced arbitrarily, depending on each individual case."
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During the final round, held in March 2007, the Serbian leadership (clearly backed by the Russian government) rejected Ahtisaari's settlement recommendation as unacceptable. Following the failure of the Vienna talks, the Special Envoy produced a report elaborating on his views. He acknowledged that although "both parties have reaffirmed their categorical, diametrically opposed positions: Belgrade demands Kosovo's autonomy within Serbia, while Priština will accept nothing short of independence," there was a pressing urgency to resolve Kosovo's status. Accordingly, the Special Envoy, based on his conclusions that "[r]eintegration into Serbia is not a viable option" and that "[c] ontinued international administration is not sustainable," recommended the following: "Kosovo's status should be independence, supervised by the international community." 58 Later, the Contact Group supported the establishment of a Troika consisting of representatives of the EU, US, and Russia to continue with further negotiations on the future status of Kosovo, hoping to achieve a mutually acceptable solution. Different scenarios put forward-including the Serbian proposal for a loose integration model (inspired by the one of Hong Kong), according to which Kosovo would get more than autonomy, but less than independence, 59 and the Kosovo Albanian proposal, promoting the 63 Such an outcome was crucial not only for the Kosovo Albanian population, as they would get their own state, but also for the West itself as it would help justify the need for the 1999 NATO military intervention. On the other hand, although some members of the Serbian political establishment tried to promote a narrative that Kosovo was de facto independent and that both parties' representatives had to focus on the processes of democratization and Europeanization, the majority (aware of the importance of public support in order to preserve their own status) continued to insist that Kosovo was and, most relevantly, would always be a constituent part of the Republic of Serbia-an approach backed by the Russian authorities whenever possible. The Kosovo Albanians, while understanding the divisions characterizing external rhetoric as capable of prolonging stagnation in terms of Kosovo's final status, decided to make a move themselves, hoping for international approval and recognition. 
Russia and Kosovo's Proclamation of Independence
In February 2008, the Kosovo Albanian leadership adopted a resolution proclaiming independence from the Republic of Serbia. 64 With regard to the European Union and its Member States' position, the response was far from the one witnessed on 15 January 1992, when both the then European Community and its twelve members recognized Slovenia and Croatia as independent states, and thus terminated the existence of the Yugoslav Federation. This time, due to the overall context, a session entitled Developments as Regards the Future Status of Kosovo, hosted by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, before Kosovo's proclamation of independence, clearly warned of possible divisions and their implications: "It is still in question whether the EU will manage to speak with one single voice in the case of UDI [Unilateral Declaration of Independence]; while some member states are prepared to recognize a UDI-including key countries such as the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Italy-a few others continue to express their hesitation at the prospect. The risk that, in the end, the decision on whether to recognize an independent Kosovo might be left individually to EU member states is not to be excluded."
65 Across the EU, apart from five of its members (Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia, and Spain) that decided not to recognize the newly self-proclaimed Republic of Kosovo, the others rushed to do so.
The position of the Russian Federation was in stark contrast to the one adopted by the dominant Western powers. Its Ministry of Foreign Affairs reacted immediately, stating that the UDI "violat[ed] the sovereignty of the Republic of Serbia, the Charter of the United Nations, UNSCR 1244, the principles of the Helsinki Final Act, Kosovo's Constitutional Framework and the high-level Contact Group accords," and warning the international community of "the risk of an escalation of tension and inter-ethnic violence in the province and of new conflict in the Balkans."
66 Similar massages were delivered by individual statesman, ranging from Putin, for whom "[t]he precedent of Kosovo is a terrible precedent, which will de facto blow apart the whole system of interna- The Russian rhetoric in the immediate post-UDI period turned out to be relevant for all the concerned sides. While the Serbs perceived it as extremely favorable for their own position, the Kosovo Albanians as well as the Brussels administration continued to feel challenged. A new round of official visits and statements very well illustrated the trend in place. For example, in mid-April 2009, the Russian Federation submitted a 40-page statement to the International Court of Justice (previously approached by the UN General Assembly with a request for advisory opinion as to whether the UDI was in accordance with international law), outlining its arguments in order to conclude that "the unilateral declaration of independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo is not in accordance with international law." 70 In May, while welcoming a new ambassador from Serbia to Russia, Medvedev stressed: "We intend to continue to coordinate our foreign policy moves in future, including the ones related to the solving of the issue with Kosovo." 71 Soon after, this approach was additionally clarified; in an interview to the Belgrade daily Večernje novosti, Russian Ambassador to Serbia Aleksandr Konuzin stated that "Russia's stand is rather simple-we are ready to back whatever position Serbia takes," but also made clear that "the EU is not an alternative to relations with Russia." 72 Instead, the ambassador explained that even Russia itself was keen on consolidating its relations with the EU, given the economic and political links, and therefore it was necessary "to find forms of cooperation 67 The Sunday Morning Herald, "Putin Calls Kosovo Independence 'Terrible Precedent,'" 23 February 2008. between Serbia, Russia and the EU that would be beneficial to all three sides." 73 Still, it was Medvedev's visit to Belgrade in October 2009 that offered a clearer picture about Russian intentions and long-term involvement in the region. In his analysis, Aleksandar Fatić rightly observes that "[t]he visit marked a sharp turn…, with the new and more assertive rhetoric suggesting Russia's willingness to engage in 'infighting' the Western military and energy security interests." 74 For both Medvedev and Konuzin, it was important to assure the Serbs that "Kosovo echoes in the hearts of all Russians with the same pain as it does in your hearts." 75 In terms of further clarification of the Russian position, it did not take long before Konuzin decided that it was necessary to warn the Serbian authorities that their country could not join NATO and count on endless Russian support-a standpoint expected to send a signal that NATO membership would affect the previously promised support. 76 Later, when Putin visited Serbia in March 2011 (thus after the publication of the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice stipulating that Kosovo's UDI was in accordance with international law 77 ), in addition to confirming Russia's willingness to support its South Slavic brothers in the energy and financial spheres, he also stated that Russia would support Serbia's Kosovo policy, observing that it was "not necessary to elaborate on the reasons for this, as they are deeply rooted in the two countries' long history of relations and their closeness." 78 Following the 2012 elections in Serbia, Putin congratulated the newly elected President Tomislav Nikolić, the founder and first president of the Serbian Progressive Party, who had underlined that Serbia needed to focus on new opportunities (including cooperation with all countries in the world as well as EU membership) and less on alternatives (usually implying the choice between the West and Russia), while Kosovo was seen as an autonomous province of Serbia, not independent-an approach generally welcomed by the voters, especially the ones who were not entirely convinced about their last-minute decision to give their vote to Nikolić, a former Radical, and not to the former 73 Ibid. president, Boris Tadić of the Democratic Party. 79 The Russian leader kept insisting on friendship and mutually beneficial cooperation-links that are in the interest of the two countries as well as Europe as a whole. 80 The exchange of words of support between the two presidents encouraged various assessments in the West. Some EU officials noted that Serbia was "at a crossroads"; Nikolić's victory "proved that the country's political landscape had become more complex and that the EU needs to be involved in an intensive dialogue with Serbian authorities and all political leaders from the very first moment." 81 At home, while the panic surrounding government formation was going on, 82 the newly elected president decided to pay his first visit abroad, to Russia. Although informal in official terms, this visit opened numerous questions about the politics of alternatives and whether the new Serbian leadership, contrary to the electoral campaign, was going to minimize its links with the West and move more towards the East. As reported, in Moscow, Russian president Putin started his welcome note by wishing Nikolić "to implement everything that was stated in [his] election program and to fulfill the Serbian people's expectations," that economic cooperation between the two "increased by almost 50% in the past year" and that Russians "see Serbs as [their] spiritual brothers."
83 Indeed, given the worrying economic situation at home (the average salary at around €300 and the youth unemployment rate at more than 40 percent), the Serbian leadership had to explore opportunities that would eventually improve the living standard of the citizens of Serbia. As Russia's deputy prime minister Dmitry Rogozin stated during his visit to Serbia, "The difference between the EU's and Russia's approach is that Russia has the desire and money to invest in Serbia." Rogozin also underlined something that is of crucial importance to pro-European forces, that " [t] here is no conflict of interest between Serbia's EU membership and friendship with Russia. but then canceled, 85 was seen as a big step forward: by having the pipeline passing through its territory, Serbia would be getting cheaper gas and Russia would secure access to a bigger European market and confirm its influence in European Union affairs given that the 21st century is often described as the century of energy politics. Additionally, a strong Serbian-Russian economic partnership could also lead to a strong political partnership, an upgrade that is surely facilitated by Nikolić's clear announcement in Moscow that "Serbia will never become a member of NATO." 86 However, Russian military intervention in Ukraine and the consequent annexation of Crimea in March 2014 encouraged numerous questions about similarities between the cases of Kosovo and Crimea and the contradictions and inconsistencies characterizing Russia's approach towards the notion of territorial integrity. As assessed by Michael Ignatieff, "Putin is serving up a series of international law justifications that are periodic versions of some of the ones he didn't like in the 1990s." 87 Still, as Putin explained it, "[Russia's] western partners created the Kosovo precedent with their own hands. In a situation absolutely the same as the one in Crimea they recognized Kosovo's secession from Serbia legitimate while arguing that no permission from a country's central authority for a unilateral declaration of independence is necessary." 88 While discussing the West's position vis-à-vis Kosovo-with the former insisting that the latter be treated as a unique case-Putin observed that such an approach is "beyond double standards.… It's a kind of baffling, primitive and blatant cynicism. One can't just twist things to fit his interests, to call something white on one day and black on the next one." 89 In the West, as expected, Russian official rhetoric and the policies adopted were analyzed and heavily criticized. 90 91 In a similar way, German Chancellor Angela Merkel described the comparison as "shameful," clarifying that the Kosovo crisis was characterized by "years in which the international community had no power to intervene, while Slobodan Milošević carried out his ethnic cleansing," and only when it became clear that the status quo was not tolerable any longer, "NATO then decided to act alone because Russia continuously blocked any UN mandate on Serbia." 92 Some scholars went on to claim that, if a parallel should be drawn, it should be between Crimea and Croatia (whose authorities autonomously held a referendum on independence, in May 1991), not Kosovo. 93 The Kosovo Albanian authorities understandably showed appreciation for such clear-cut perceptions, clearly reflecting their own interests. In an interview to Reuters, Kosovo's Prime Minister Hashim Thaci insisted that " [u] nder no circumstances can the Kosovo case be compared with the case of Crimea. Kosovo is a unique case. The international community intervened after the genocide by Serbia took place.… We never demanded to leave one country and join another." 94 In neighboring Albania, the official line has supported such a view; as observed by Prime Minister Edi Rama, Putin's comparison made no sense whatsoever. 95 Since the beginning of the Ukrainian crisis, the Serbian leadership has tried to adopt a neutral position that would show respect toward Russia, but also be acceptable for the Brussels administration, so that Serbia's integration in the European Union would not be compromised. In his study about Serbia's position, Filip Ejdus has suggested that its neutrality should not be understood "as purely rational and interest-driven." In fact, Serbia's behavior was very much due to "an existing tension between two powerful collective identity narratives in Serbia"-one which is about belonging to Europe (the EU and the West more generally) and the other which is about Orthodox brotherhood with Russia; accordingly, while "[u]nable to change either its identity or its behavior, Serbia resorted to avoidance, a defensive mechanism used by actors who seek to reduce an identity conflict by selective exposure to information and denial of the dissonance."
96 However, at the official level, while trying to defend his country's standpoint, Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić said that "[w]e support the territorial integrity of every country, including Ukraine. But, let's put it this way, I asked that Serbia, for the sake of traditional ties … maintain its position and not introduce sanctions against Russia." 97 Soon after, Serbian Foreign Minister Ivica Dačić confirmed that "Serbia will never work against Russia, that it is a question of morality, and that Serbia and Russia will continue their mutual projects." 98 Furthermore, the presence of Serbian volunteers helping pro-Russian forces in Crimea-a support strongly inspired by their shared Orthodox faith, Russia's advocacy in the case of Kosovo, and, more generally, anti-Western views 99 -encouraged a range of thoughts about the balancing aspect and thus Serbia's overall direction.
To begin with, it is important to note that since 2007, the volume of contacts, prospects for cooperation, and promises exchanged between Serbia and Russia has remarkably increased. 100 At the same time, pro-EU sentiment in Serbia has decreased. 101 Still, according to some observers, the former should not be the reason for the latter; as pointed out by Sonja Biserko, head of the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, "without Russia's involvement and without its support in certain informal centers, Serbia would not be in the situation in which it unfortunately finds itself today," blaming the Serbian elite for being naïve to believe that "it is in Russia's interest to support Serbia. It is a naïve way of looking at the world, bound up with the provincialism that imbues our perception of the world and what is happening around us." 102 Indeed, the Crimean question has revealed that Russia was ready to ignore its previous advocacy of territorial integrity and pursue its own geopolitical interest by assisting Ukraine's disintegration. Going further, with the election of a new Serbian government in 2012, the country was once again exposed to the question of alternatives and speculations (Russia or the European Union and, most likely, NATO membership), but this time the situation seemed rather different, as the new government presented itself as fully aware both of the existing uncertainties and, more importantly for its own reputation, Serbia's opportunities. With this in mind, there was not much space left for the politics of alternatives. The Progressivist-dominated leadership decided to focus on potential benefits, regardless of the provider. Surely, it would have been problematic to present the Russian Federation as an alternative, economically or ideologically. Economically, the EU is Serbia's biggest trade partner. Ideologically, although Titoist Yugoslavia was often proud of its similarity to the Soviet Union, present-day Serbs are trying to be closer to the EU and the West in general rather than the Russians. Some recent research has revealed that Serbs are less interested in studying Russian than English, that they find Western culture much more attractive than Russian, and very relevantly, the ones who decide to emigrate looking for better living conditions do not really opt for Russia, but some other, more economically and politically stable countries. 103 In the end, the signature of the EU-brokered April 2013 Agreement between Belgrade and Priština-assessed as "a landmark deal" by the Brussels administration, 104 "the best possible offer" by Ivica Dačić, 105 "a first and historic agreement between Serbia and Kosovo" by Hashim Thaci, 106 has provided space for policy reconsiderations and suggested that Serbia has to focus on political adjustments and durable solutions, which imply good neighborhood relationships. 107 In this respect, Serbia has entered a rather difficult phase, which should result in providing Kosovo with its already long-awaited status. Aware of the new view about EU accession (stating that the Brussels administration is actually much worse that the Soviet regime), 113 are persuasive efforts suggesting what kind of direction should Serbia should pursue.
Conclusion
The 1999 Kosovo crisis has encouraged a whole range of dilemmas and questions (some answered and some, hopefully, to be answered), including the question of Russia's involvement. In contrast to the period before the Yugoslav state crisis of the early 1990s, when there was no obvious Soviet interest in Kosovo as an autonomous province of Serbia, the post-Yugoslav period has witnessed an increased engagement on the part of Moscow. This started with attending the inauguration of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1992, continued throughout the decade by participation in numerous meetings and official statements, and culminated with the Kosovo war and the consequent discussions about Kosovo's final status. Writing about the post-1999 period, one author suggested that Russia's presence in the region "should implicitly be considered the country's most significant regional interest. Such a presence could be regarded as necessary in order not to let the developments in the area be controlled completely by other international actors. Also, a Russian presence seems to be both acceptable and desirable to regional and external actors as an important balancing element. The Balkans, in this line of thinking, might represent the only area outside the territory of the former USSR in which Russia has a chance to achieve results that are not available to other external actors."
114 Clearly disappointed with the NATO-led intervention and its marginal role, the Kremlin insisted on the territorial integrity of the Republic of Serbia. As expected, the 2008 declaration of independence of Kosovo was simply unacceptable in every respect. For the majority of Serbs this proved vital in their attempt to preserve Kosovo, regardless of the signals coming from the West, including the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice.
However, Moscow's policy of amity and cooperation with Belgrade not only served the cause of the Serbian representatives before the international community, but also the cause of the Russian leadership, hoping to strengthen its own position in the EU and world politics more broadly. As Andrew Konitzer correctly observed in 2010, "Russia's 'defense' of Kosovo bought critical time for Serbia to mount a diplomatic offensive which has contributed to the current impasse over the province's future status while avoiding head-on confrontation with major Western actors," but then, when thinking ble solution (in the case of Kosovo, regarding its status, protection of human rights, fight against corruption, institutional capacity building, and so on), even though various initiatives and EU summits have tried to communicate the message that the future of both Kosovo and Serbia lies within the EU. 119 However, in the embedded confrontational relationship, individual external actors-less concerned with the progress of Kosovo, but more with their own standing-have understood their involvement as an opportunity, geoeconomic or geopolitical.
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